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Abstract
In large-scale distributed infrastructures, applications are realised through com-
munications among distributed components. The need for methods for assuring
safe interactions in such environments is recognised, however the existing frame-
works, relying on centralised verification or restricted specification methods, have
limited applicability. This paper proposes a new theory of monitored pi-calculus
with dynamic usage of multiparty session types (MPST), offering a rigorous foun-
dation for safety assurance of distributed components which asynchronously com-
municate through multiparty sessions. Our theory establishes a framework for
semantically precise decentralised run-time enforcement and provides reasoning
principles over monitored distributed applications, which complement existing
static analysis techniques. We introduce asynchrony through the means of explicit
routers and global queues, and propose novel equivalences between networks, that
capture the notion of interface equivalence, i.e. equating networks offering the
same services to a user. We illustrate our static-dynamic analysis system with an
ATM protocol as a running example and justify our theory with results: satisfac-
tion equivalence, local/global safety and transparency, and session fidelity.
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1. Introduction
One of the main challenges in the engineering of distributed systems is the
comprehensive verification of distributed software without relying on ad-hoc and
expensive testing techniques. Multiparty session types (MPST) is a typing dis-
cipline for communication programming, that was originally developed in the
pi-calculus [33, 6, 9, 23, 24, 16] towards tackling this challenge. The idea is
that applications are built starting from units of design called sessions. Each type
of session, involving multiple roles, is first modelled from a global perspective
(global type) and then projected onto local types, one for each role involved. As
a verification method, the existing MPST systems focus on static type checking
of endpoint processes against local types. The standard properties enjoyed by
well-typed processes are communication safety (all processes conform to glob-
ally agreed communication protocols) and freedom from deadlocks.
The direct application of the theoretical MPST techniques to the current prac-
tice, however, presents a few obstacles. First, the existing type systems are tar-
geted at calculi with first class primitives for linear communication channels and
communication-oriented control flow; the majority of mainstream engineering
languages would need to be extended in this sense to be suitable for syntactic
type checking using session types. Unfortunately, it is not always straightforward
to add these features to the specific host languages. Furthermore, the executable
processes in a distributed system may be implemented in different languages. Sec-
ond, for domains where dynamically typed or untyped languages are popular (e.g.,
Web programming), or in multi-organisational scenarios, the introduction of static
typing infrastructure to support MPST may not be realistic.
Development of Heterogeneous Systems based on MPSTs. This article pro-
poses a theoretical framework addressing the issues discussed above, by support-
ing the combination of static and dynamic verification of processes communi-
cating in a network. Fig. 1 illustrates the proposed framework. As standard in
MPST [33, 6], the first stage is to specify a global protocol as a global type, de-
scribing how the participants should interact in a multiparty session. The global
type is then mechanically projected to generate local protocols, as local types,
specifying the communication behaviour expected of each role in the session. The
global type in Fig. 1 involves three roles, yielding three local types upon projec-
tion. Next, each principal in a network implements one (or possibly more) local
types. We call these implementations endpoint processes, or simply processes.
We aim to capture the decentralised nature of distributed application develop-
ment, providing support for heterogeneous distributed systems by allowing com-
ponents to be independently implemented, using different languages, libraries and
programming techniques. Assume that (1) the process on the right-hand side of
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Figure 1: Static/dynamic verification through global types and projection
Fig. 1 is implemented in a language that supports static verification with session
typing techniques, and that conformance to the implemented local type is veri-
fied this way, and (2) the other two processes are implemented in standard Java
and Python, respectively, using simple session programming APIs and are not
amenable to static typing. To ensure that the composition of these three processes
conforms to the intended protocol we wrap the processes that cannot be stati-
cally verified with dedicated distributed monitors, that dynamically verify their
participation in the session. In other words, our framework allows processes to be
independently verified, either statically during deployment, or dynamically during
execution, while retaining the strong global safety properties of statically verified
systems.
This work is motivated in part by our ongoing collaboration with the Ocean
Observatories Initiative (OOI) [44], a project to establish cyberinfrastructure for
the delivery, management and analysis of scientific data from a large network
of ocean sensor systems. Their architecture relies on the combination of high-
level protocol specifications (to express how the infrastructure services should
be used) and distributed run-time monitoring to regulate the behaviour of third-
party applications in the system. An implementation of the framework in Fig. 1 is
currently integrated into the OOI infrastructure. In this implementation, processes
are specified using Scribble [47, 51, 31, 30] (a practical incarnation of MPST) and
processes are implemented in the Python programming language and dynamically






















Figure 2: Architecture of monitored/unmonitored networks
Monitored Networks. Networks are organised as follows: a group of princi-
pals run processes communicating via asynchronous message passing; dedicated
trusted monitors (one for each principal) guard the run-time behaviour of both the
environment and that principal, through the evaluation of incoming and outgo-
ing messages. The aim is to protect the principal from violations by other prin-
cipals, and also to prevent the principal from committing violation (this can be
used e.g. for debugging). Monitors regulate (1) the initiation, by principals, of
new sessions, each specified by a well-defined global type, and (2) the movement
of messages within each session. Fig. 2 illustrates the architecture of a network
with three principals (α1, α2 and α3); all principals are monitored except α3,
namely we assume the processes run by α3 have been statically checked hence
its monitor can be switched-off (indeed all outgoing and incoming messages can
pass through without dynamic checking); each principal is associated with one
or more shared queues, on which all other principals can send invitations to join
new sessions. The messages exchanged within a session are all associated to one
common session ID, and the exchange of messages in a session is regulated by
verifying that the causality of messages follows the specification (roughly, the en-
semble of local types) of that session. In Fig. 2 each principal is associated with
exactly one shared queue, and we denote with ai the queue associated with αi,
with i ∈ {1, 2, 3}; principal α1 is currently playing role Alice in two sessions with
session IDs s and s′, whereas α2 and α3 are playing Bob and Carol, respectively,
in just one session s (e.g., the invitations to join s′ have not yet been received by
them).
A Formal Theory for Dynamic Verification. Our theory is based on the idea
that, if the endpoint processes in a system are independently verified (either stati-
cally or dynamically) to conform a local type, then the corresponding global pro-
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tocol is respected as a whole. To this goal, we propose a new formal model and
a bisimulation theory for heterogeneous networks of monitored and unmonitored
processes.
For the first time, we model dynamic verification based on types for the pi-
calculus. We provide an explicit account of the routing mechanism that is im-
plicitly present inside the MPST framework: in a session, messages are sent to
abstract roles (e.g. to a Seller), and a router (a dynamically updated component of
the network) translates these roles into actual addresses.
Our approach also aims at giving a semantical equivalence for a collection of
protocols (and networks), by reaching a formal criterion for equating services. By
taking the routing feature into account when designing novel equivalences, our
formal model can relate networks built in different ways (through different distri-
butions or relocations of services) but offering the same interface to an external
observer. The router, being in charge of associating roles with principals, hides
to an external user the internal composition of a network: what distinguishes two
networks is not their structure but the services they are able to provide, or more
precisely, the local types they offer to the outside. We prove that bisimulation
is compositional (Proposition 4.4) and that equivalent networks satisfy the same
specification (Proposition 4.6).
We formally define a satisfaction relation to express when the behaviour of a
network conforms to a global specification and we prove a number of properties of
our model: local safety (Theorem 5.2) states that a monitored process respects its
local protocol, i.e. that dynamic verification by monitoring is sound; global safety
(Theorem 5.4) extends local safety to networks involving multiple principals; lo-
cal transparency (Theorem 6.1) states that a monitored process has equivalent
behaviour to an unmonitored but well-behaved (e.g. statically typed) process; and
global transparency (Theorem 6.3) states that a network where each principal is
monitored has equivalent behaviour to an unmonitored but well-behaved network.
Finally, we introduce a stronger property than global safety, session fidelity
(Theorem 7.13), which not only guarantees conformance of each monitored pro-
cess in a network to the ensemble of local specifications, but also requires that
the overall flow of messages throughout the router is correct. In this way, session
fidelity shows the correspondency between the behaviour of a monitored system
and the behaviour specified by a global protocol. Together, these properties justify
our framework for decentralised verification by allowing monitored and unmoni-
tored processes to be safely mixed while preserving protocol conformance for the
entire network. Technically, these properties also ensure the coherence of our the-
ory, by relating the satisfaction relations with the semantics and static validation
procedures.
Our theory is more involved than most of the existing works in the domain
of session verification [33] as, for the first time, both networks and monitoring
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are made explicit. Our abstract model for session networks describe the evolution
of the network at a lower-level; for instance, we introduce dynamic update of
routing information: a participant taking part in a session does not send a message
to another participant, but sends a message to a role which is then routed by the
networks to the corresponding participant.
Contributions and Outline. This work is an extended version of [7] that in-
cludes: the definitions omitted in [7], additional examples, and full proofs. Specif-
ically, we extended [7] by including the following additional material:
• the formal definition of monitorability, a consistency condition on global
types, together with a discussion on its relevance and a statement of its
decidability (§ 2.2);
• the detailed definitions, full formal statement and proofs of session fidelity
and its relationship with global safety (in this introduction, § 5 and § 7),
which is only outlined in [7];
• a simpler but less restrictive semantics of networks (e.g., a principal is now
allowed to engage as different participants in the same session);
• a detailed formalisation for behavioural equivalences (§ 4.3)
• a formal statement on global safety in mixed (i.e., monitored and unmoni-
tored) networks (Corollary 6.4);
§ 2 and § 3 introduce the formalisms for protocol specifications and networks, re-
spectively. § 3 provides a formal framework for monitored networks based on
pi-calculus processes and protocol-based run-time enforcement through monitors.
§ 4 introduces: a semantics for specifications (§ 4.1), a novel behavioural theory
for compositional reasoning over monitored networks through the use of equiva-
lences (bisimilarity and barbed congruence) and the satisfaction relation (§ 4.2).
Local and global safety are stated and proved in § 5, transparency in § 6, and ses-
sion fidelity in § 7. Related works are discussed in § 8 and future works in § 9.
2. Monitorability in Multiparty Session Types
This section provides basic definitions and well-formedness conditions for
multiparty session types. In § 2.1 we summarise the syntax of multiparty ses-
sion types annotated with logical assertions (MPST), which we use to model pro-
tocols. In § 2.2, we introduce a condition called monitorability, enforceable on
MPST, that sets the basis for the results presented in the next sections.
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A ::= tt | ff |e1 = e2 |e1 < e2 |¬A |A1 ∧A2 |A1 ∨A2
e ::= v | e1 + e2 | e1 − e2 | e1 ∗ e2 | e1 mod e2
S ::= bool | int | string
G ::= r1→r2 : {li(xi :Si){Ai}.Gi}i∈I | G1 | G2 | µt.G | t | end
T ::= r!{li(xi :Si){Ai}.Ti}i∈I | r?{li(xi :Si){Ai}.Ti}i∈I | µt.T | t | end
Figure 3: Global and local types with assertions
2.1. Multiparty Session Types with Assertions
Multiparty session types with assertions [9] are abstract descriptions of the
structure of interactions among the roles in a multiparty session (i.e., in a pro-
tocol); they specify the potential flows of messages, the conditions under which
interactions may occur, and the constraints on the communicated values.
Global types with assertions, or just global types, describe multiparty sessions
from a network perspective. Global types can be projected onto local types with
assertions, or just local types, each describing the protocol from the perspective
of a single role.
The syntax of global types (G,G′, . . .) and local types (T, T ′, . . .) is defined
in Fig. 3. We let values v, v′, . . . range over boolean constants, numerals and
strings, and e, e′, . . . range over first-order expressions. Assertions, ranged over
by A,A′, . . . are logical predicates used to express constraints on the values com-
municated. We consider assertions following the grammar given in Fig. 3 although
other decidable logics could be used. For instance, in [9, 24] the logics includes
existential quantifiers which we have omitted for simplicity (of evaluation of the
assertions by the run-time monitors), and because they are not necessary for our
run-time theory. The sorts of exchanged values (S, S ′, . . .) consists of atomic
types.
Global Types with Assertions. r1 → r2 : {li(xi : Si){Ai}.Gi}i∈I models an
interaction where role r1 sends role r2 one of the branch labels li, as well as a
payload denoted by an interaction variable xi of sort Si. Interaction variable xi
binds its occurrences in Ai and Gi. Ai is the assertion which needs to hold for r1
to select li, and which may constrain the values instantiating xi. G1 | G2 specifies
two (independent) parallel threads in a session. We assume G | end and end | G
are identical with G. µt.G is a recursive type, where G is guarded in the standard
way [45, 6], and end ends the session.
Example 2.1 (ATM: the global type). Global typeGATM specifies an ATM scenario.
Each session of ATM involves three roles: a client C, a payment server S and a
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separate authenticator A.
GATM = C→ A : { Login(xi : string){tt}.
A→ S : { LoginOK(){tt}. A→ C : {LoginOK(){tt}. GLOOP},
LoginFail(){tt}. A→ C : {LoginFail(){tt}. end}}}
GLOOP = µ LOOP.
S→ C : { Account(xb : int){xb ≥ 0}.
C→ S : { Withdraw(xp : int){xp > 0 ∧ xb − xp ≥ 0}. LOOP,
Deposit(xd : int){xd > 0}. LOOP,
Quit(){tt}.end}}
At the beginning of the session C sends A payload xi (i.e., the login details); then
A decides whether the authentication is successful or not, and informs S and C of
the choice by sending either label LoginOK or LoginFail. If LoginFail is cho-
sen then the session terminates. If LoginOK is chosen then C and S enter a loop
specified by GLoop. In each iteration of GLoop, S sends C the amount xb currently
available in the account. The predicate states that xb must be non negative. C can
then choose one of the following three labels: Withdraw (withdraws an amount
xp, which must be positive and not exceed the current amount xb), Deposit (de-
posits a positive amount xd in the account), or Quit (ends the session). If either
Withdraw or Deposit was chosen then another iteration is executed.
Local Types with Assertions. Each local type T is associated with a role taking
part in a session. Local type r!{li(xi :Si){Ai}.Ti}i∈I models an interaction where
the role under consideration (say p) sends r a branch label li and a message de-
noted by an interaction variable xi of sort Si. Its dual is the receive interaction
p?{li(xi : Si){Ai}.Ti}i∈I , where the role under consideration (say r) receives a
message from p. As customary for MPST, only global types can be composed in
parallel, namely there is no parallel composition of local types. This is guaranteed
by a well-formedness condition on global types (see Definition 2.4) formally de-
fined on the projection function, and requiring a given role to appear in only one
side of a parallel composition. The remaining local type syntax is similar to the
one of global types.
Example 2.2 (On causalities in global type). Consider the following global type:
Gseq = r1 → r2 : (x : int){tt}.
r3 → r4 : (y : int){tt}.end
The interaction from r1 to r2 and the interaction from r3 to r4 are causally un-
related. In fact, due to distribution, one cannot enforce r3 to send y after r2 has
received x (unless additional interactions are introduced, for example between r2
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and r3). In fact (as in [33, 6, 9, 23, 24, 16]) the global type above specifies the
same behaviour as
Gpar = r1 → r2 : (x : int){tt}.end | r3 → r4 : (y : int){tt}.end
Where interactions are causally unrelated, we will use the parallel global types
Gpar rather than the sequential one Gseq .
The global type below, instead, requires the completion of the first interaction
before r2 can send the next message:
r1 → r2 : (x : int){tt}.
r2 → r4 : (y : int){tt}.end
In addition, due to asynchrony, causality may affect the send and receive actions
of an interaction in different ways, as shown by the global type below.
r1 → r2 : (x : int){tt}.
r1 → r4 : (y : int){tt}.end
Variable y must be sent by r1 only after variable x is sent, but possibly before x is
received by r2.
One can derive a set of local types Ti from a global type G by endpoint pro-
jection. As in [23, 24], our definition of endpoint projection relies on a merge
operator on local types which is useful to coherently assemble the behaviour that
a role has in different branches of a global type, as illustrated in Example 2.3.
Example 2.3 (Merging local behaviours). Consider the following global type:
r1 → r2 : { l1(x : int){tt}.r2 → r3 : l3(x′ : int){tt}.end,
l2(y : string){tt}.r2 → r3 : l4(y′ : string){tt}.end}
When defining the local behaviour of r3 one must take into account that the first
communication between r1 and r2 is not visible to r3. From the perspective of r3
the session will either be described as either r2?l3(x′ : int){tt}.end or r2?l4(y′ :
string){tt}.end. The overall behaviour of r3 is obtained by merging the two local
types above into one branching as follows:
r2?{l3(x′ : int){tt}.end, l4(y′ : string){tt}.end}
Definition 2.1. We define the union of two local types as the following partial
operator:
1. T ∪ T = T
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2.
r?lk{(xk :Sk){Ak}.Tk}k∈I ∪ r?lk{(xk :Sk){Ak}.Tk}k∈J =
r?lk{(xk :Sk){Ak}.Tk}k∈I∪J with I ∩ J = ∅
Local types are idempotent w.r.t. ∪ and is otherwise undefined when types are
not both input types from the same sender. In this case, all possible labels, together
with their associated payload, types, assertions and continuations are collected
into a single type.
Definition 2.2. Assume all labels are indexed and li = lj if and only if i = j.
The merge operator unionsq is a partial operator on local types, and is defined by the
following axioms (closed by standard typed contexts):
1. T unionsq T = T
2. r?{li(xi :Si){Ai}.Ti}i∈I unionsq r?lj{(x′j :S ′j){A′j}.T ′j}j∈J =
r?lk{(xk :Sk){Ak}.Tk}k∈I\J ∪ r?lk{(x′k :S ′k){A′k}.T ′k}k∈J\I∪
r?lk{(xk :Sk){Ak ∨ A′k}.Tk unionsq T ′k}k∈I∩J
when ∀k ∈ I ∩ J, xk = x′k, and Sk = S ′k.
By (1) each local type is idempotent w.r.t. unionsq. Axiom (2) merges two local types
receiving messages from a common role, say r. The resulting local type includes
the union of the branches having distinguished labels (i.e. in I \ J and J \ I), and
integrates the common labels (i.e., in I∩J). When integrating the common labels,
axiom (2) makes sure that they have the same sorts (i.e., Sk = S ′k). The merge
operator in [23, 24] is defined on local types without assertions. We define the
predicate of the resulting local type to be the disjunction of the predicates of the
local types being merged (i.e.,Ak∨A′k). We motivate this choice via Examples 2.4
and 2.5. The intuition is that, when allowing merging for receiving actions only,
the message, from the point of view of the local participant, satisfies a predicate
for one of the branches.
Example 2.4 (Merging assertions). Consider the following global type:
r1 → r2 : { l1(x : int){tt}.r2 → r3 : l3(x′ : int){x′ > 0}.end,
l2(y : string){tt}.r2 → r3 : l3(x′ : int){x′ > 10}.end}
This scenario differs from the one in Example 2.3 from the fact that r3 is expecting
label l3 in both branches (hence the behaviours of the common label l3 need to be
integrated). Role r3 must be able to accept a value for x′ that satisfies x′ > 0 or
x′ > 10 (without knowing which branch between l1 or l2 was selected, hence to
which assertion r2 must obey). Therefore we relax the expectation of r3 to expect
either case (i.e., a value satisfying the disjunction of the predicates):
r2?{l3(x′ : int){x′ > 0 ∨ x′ > 10}.end}
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When merging two local types, say T1 and T2, if none of the axioms in Defini-
tion 2.2 applies then we say that T1 and T2 are non mergeable. As in [23, 24] we
let the local types for sending interactions to be non mergeable (i.e., axiom 2 can
only be applied to receive interactions) unless the send interactions to be merged
are identical (in which case one can merge by axiom 1). Example 2.5 illustrates
the motivation of this choice.
Example 2.5 (Non mergeability of send interactions). In the global type below
r1 → r2 : { l1(x : int){tt}.r3 → r2 : l3(x′ : int){tt}.end,
l2(y : string){tt}.r3 → r2 : l4(y′ : string){tt}.end}
Considering local behaviour of role r3 that role r3 must choose between l3 and
l4 without knowing which branch was chosen by r1 in the first interaction. If we
allowed to merge the two behaviours of r3 we would also allow, for instance, r3
to select l3 after r1 had selected l2. In this scenario the behaviour r3 would not
conform to the expectations of r2 with respect to the global type. In Definition 2.2
we require, instead, that when a sender r does not know which branch was chosen
by other roles in a previous interaction, then r must act in the same way in all
branches. The following global type is, for instance, mergeable by axiom (1) in
Definition 2.2:
r1 → r2 : { l1(x : int){tt}.r3 → r2 : l3(x′ : int){tt}.end,
l2(y : string){tt}.r3 → r2 : l3(x′ : int){tt}.end}
Let roles(G) be the set of roles in G. Formally,
roles(r1→r2 : {li(xi :Si){Ai}.Gi}i∈I) = {r1, r2}
⋃
i∈I roles(Gi)
roles(G1 | G2) = roles(G1) ∪ roles(G2)
roles(µt.G) = roles(G)
roles(t) = roles(end) = ∅
We next define ftv(G), the set of free type variables in G as:
ftv(r1→r2 : {li(xi :Si){Ai}.Gi}i∈I) = ∪i∈I ftv(Gi) ftv(end) = ∅
ftv(G1 | G2) = ftv(G1) ∪ ftv(G2) ftv(µt.G) = ftv(G) \ {t} ftv(t) = t
The set fv(A) of free variables occurring in A is defined as follows:
fv(tt) = fv(ff) = ∅ fv(e1 = e2) = fv(e1 < e2) = fv(e1) ∪ fv(e2)
fv(¬A) = fv(A) fv(A1 ∧ A2) = fv(A1 ∨ A2) = fv(A1) ∪ fv(A2)
fv(x) = {x}
fv(e1 op e2) = fv(e1) ∪ fv(e2) op ∈ {+,−, ∗, mod}
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Definition 2.3 (Projection). Assume r1, r2, r ∈ G and r1 6= r2. The projection
of G on r, written G  r, is defined as follows:
(r1 → r2 : {li(xi :Si){Ai}.Gi}i∈I)  r =
r2!{li(xi : Si){Ai}.(Gi  r)}i∈I if r = r1
r1?{li(xi : Si){Ai}.(Gi  r)}i∈I if r = r2
unionsqi∈IGi  r {r1, r2} ∩ roles(Gi) 6= ∅
Gi Gi = t or Gi = end
undefined otherwise
(G1 | G2)  r =

Gi  r
if roles(G1) ∩ roles(G2) = ∅
and ftv(G1) ∩ ftv(G2) = ∅
i ∈ {1, 2} and r 6∈ roles(G3−i)
undefined otherwise.
µt.G  r =
{
µt.(G  r) if r ∈ G
end otherwise
t  r = t
end  r = end
The first rule projects an interaction onto sender or receiver role. Note that, if the
role is not involved in the interaction (r 6= r2 6= r1) then the projection is the local
type resulting by merging (Definition 2.2) the projections Gi  r for all i ∈ I . The
side condition ensures that we write a parallel composition if the roles and type
variables are disjoint (cf. Example 2.2). If some of the Gi  r are non mergeable
then the projection rule cannot be applied. (G1 | G2)  r is defined only when the
sets of roles of G1 and G2 are disjoint; in this case, the result of the projection is
the projection of the side of the parallel composition in which r appears (if r does
not appear further, then the projection of any side can only yield end). The other
rules are straightforward.
If none of the rules in Definition 2.3 can be applied on a global type G then G
is not projectable.
Definition 2.4 (Projectability). A global type G is projectable if all of its projec-
tions to every role r ∈ roles(G) are defined by Definition 2.3.
Hereafter in this article we will consider only projectable global types.
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Example 2.6 (ATM: the local type of C). We present the local type TC obtained by
projecting GATM on role C.




S?{Account(xb : int){xb ≥ 0}.
S!{Withdraw(xp : int){xp > 0 ∧ xb − xp ≥ 0}.
LOOP,
Deposit(xd : int){xd > 0}.LOOP,
Quit(){tt}.end}}
TC specifies the behaviour that C should follow to meet the contract of global type
GATM. TC states that C should first authenticate with A, then receive the message
Account from S, and then has the choice of sending Withdraw, or Deposit or
Quit. If label Withdraw or Deposit are chased another iteration is executed,
otherwise the session terminates.
2.2. Monitorability of Global Types
When designing a global type to be used in a monitoring framework, one
must ensure that the monitor associated to each role is always able to determine
if an incoming or outgoing message conforms to the contract or not. Example 2.7
shows that this is not the case for some global types.
Example 2.7 (Non monitorable global type). In the global type below r3 does
not know which value has been given to x in the first interaction between r1 and
r2.
Gs = r1 → r2 : (x : int){x > 5}.
r2 → r3 : (y : int){tt}.
r3 → r1 : (z : int){x > z}.end
For any value sent by r3, the monitor of r3 cannot determine whether the value
sent for z by r3 is violating or not. Similarly (but for receive interactions) in the
global type below
Gr = r1 → r2 : (x : int){x > 5}.
r2 → r4 : (y : int){y > x}.end
the monitor of r4 will not have, at run-time, information on the value of variable
x, hence will not be able to determine if the value sent by r2 for y conforms to the
assertion y > x.
We call global types as the ones illustrated in Example 2.7 non monitorable.
In the rest of this section we will give a formal definition of monitorability.
Definition 2.5 (Known variables). Let G′′ be a subterm of G. We say that p
knows x in G′′ if:
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• there exists G′ subterm of G s.t. G′ = r1→r2 : {li(xi :Si){Ai}.Gi}i∈I ,
• p ∈ {r1, r2},
• for some j ∈ I , G′′ is a subterm of Gj and x = xj .
Namely, p knows a variable x in a subterm G′′ of G if x is introduced in an
interaction of G that occurs before G′′ and that involves p.
Definition 2.6 (Monitorability). Let G be a subterm of G0. G is monitorable
w.r.t. G0 if one of the following conditions holds:
1. G = r1 → r2 : {li(xi : inti){Ai}.Gi}i∈I , and for all i ∈ I , y ∈ fv(Ai),
j ∈ {1, 2}, rj knows y in G and Gi is monitorable w.r.t. G0;
2. G = G1|G2, and for all j ∈ {1, 2}, Gj is monitorable w.r.t. G0;
3. G = µt.G′ and G′ is monitorable w.r.t. G0;
4. G = t or G = end.
We say that G is monitorable if it is monitorable w.r.t. G.
Proposition 2.7 (Decidability). Let G and G0 be global types with G subterm of
G0 and p ∈ roles(G0). It is decidable if:
1. p knows x in G,
2. G is monitorable w.r.t. G0.
Proof. (1) follows directly from: (i) the finiteness of the number of subterms of
G0 (and G), (ii) the finiteness of the number of labels in a branching (i.e., the
cardinality of the set I of indices), and (iii) the decidability of inclusion in finite
sets (e.g., p ∈ {r1, r2} and x ∈ {xi | i ∈ I} in Definition 2.5). Proposition 2.7(2)
follows from: (i) the finiteness of the number of subterms of G, (ii) the finiteness
of the number of variables in assertions, and (iii) the decidability of p knows x in
G by (1).
Knowledge of a name requires a linear search in the prefix. Monitorability
requires a quadratic exploration.
In the following sections we will show that, under the assumption that all un-
derlying global types are projectable and monitorable, the runtime monitoring
discipline we propose ensures that the interactions in a session are safe (e.g., a
principal implementing a role never receives messages of unexpected type), and
predictable (i.e., faithful to the global interaction pattern specified by the proto-
col).
Monitorability strengthens a similar property called history sensitivity in [9].
By history sensitivity, only the sender of an interaction must know the free vari-
ables of a predicate annotating that interaction. For instance, referring to Ex-
ample 2.7, Gs is not history sensitive whereas Gr is. In [9] where only static
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P ::= a〈s[r] : T 〉 | a(y[r] :T ).P | k[r1, r2]!l〈e〉 | k[r1, r2]?{li(xi).Pi}i∈I |
if e then P else Q | P | Q | 0 | µX.P | X | P ;Q | (νa) P | (νs)P
N ::= [P ]α | N1 | N2 | 0 | (νa)N | (νs)N | 〈r ; h〉
r ::= ∅ | r, s[r] 7→ α h ::= ∅ | h ·m m ::= a〈s[r] : T 〉 | s〈r1, r2, l〈v〉〉
r, r1, ... roles s, s′, ... session names X,Y, ... process variables
a, b, ... shared names x, y, ... variables P,Q, ... processes
α, β, ... principal names N,N ′, ... networks
Figure 4: Processes and the network: syntax
verification is used, it is sufficient to check that all roles send values satisfying the
assertions. Receivers can rely on this fact thanks to the assumption that the pro-
cesses implementing the other roles are well-typed. In the run-time verification
scenario we cannot assume that the rest of the network behaves safely, hence both
sent and received values must be checked. The requirement posed by monitorabil-
ity, on the other hand, allows our theory to work using a logic without existential
quantifiers. On the contrary, in [9] quantifiers were needed, during endpoint pro-
jection, to close the assertions w.r.t. those variables that were unknown to the
receivers.
3. Formal Framework of Processes and Networks
In this section we introduce a novel monitored session calculus as a variant of
the pi-calculus, which we use to model global networks. Global networks consists
of monitors and distributed programs, run by principals and implementing some
protocols.
In our formal framework, each distributed application consists of one or more
sessions among principals. A principal with behaviour P and name α is repre-
sented as [P ]α. A network is a set of principals together with a (unique) global
transport, which abstractly represents the communication functionality of a dis-
tributed system. The syntax of processes, principals, and networks is given in Fig.
4, building on the multiparty session pi-calculus from [6].
Processes. Processes, defined in Fig. 4, are ranged over by P, P ′, . . . and com-
municate using two types of channel: shared channels (or shared names) used
by processes for sending and receiving invitations to participate in sessions, and
session channels (or session names) used for communication within established
sessions. Each shared name, say a, is associated to one principal, say α, in the
sense that α can read from a; a is shared in the sense that many other principals
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can send messages to α through a. One may consider shared names as e.g., URLs
or service names. The session invitation a〈s[r] : T 〉 invites, through a shared
name a, another process to play r in a session s. The session accept a(y[r] :T ).P
receives a session invitation and, after instantiating y with the received session
name, behaves in its continuation P as specified by local type T for role r. The
selection k[r1, r2]!l〈e〉 sends, through session channel k (of an established ses-
sion), and as a sender r1 and to a receiver r2, an expression e with label l. The
branching k[r1, r2]?{li(xi).Pi}i∈I is ready to receive one of the labels and a value,
then behaves as Pi after instantiating xi with the received value. We omit labels
when I is a singleton. The conditional, parallel and inaction are standard. The
recursion µX.P defines X as P . Processes (νa)P and (νs)P hide shared names
and session names, respectively.
Principals and Network. Principals and networks are also formally defined in
Fig. 4. A principal [P ]α, with process P and name α, represents a unit of be-
haviour (hence verification) in a distributed system. A network N is a collection
of principals with a unique global transport. The behaviour of a principal, de-
scribed in its process, includes communication over shared channels to create or
join new sessions, the communication over session channels, and control struc-
tures such as conditional branching and recursion.
A global transport is a pair 〈r ; h〉 of a routing table r that associates roles
to principals, and a global queue h. The routing table r is a finite map from
session-roles and shared names to principals. If, for instance, r(a) = α then a
session invitation message through a will be delivered to principal α. Similarly,
if r(s[r]) = α then a message for r in session s will be delivered to principal α.
The global queue h is a sequence of messages a〈s[r] : T 〉 or s〈r1, r2, l〈v〉〉, ranged
over bym. Thesem represent messages-in-transit, i.e. those messages which have
been sent by some principal but have not yet been delivered. Possible shuffles
changing the ordering of in-transit messages is discussed below. Networks are
composed of principals and global transport.
Let n, n′, . . . range over shared and session channels. A network N that sat-
isfies the following conditions is well-formed: (1) N contains at most one global
transport; (2) two principals in N never have the same principal name; and (3) if
N ≡ (νn˜)(∏i[Pi]αi |〈r ; h〉) then each free shared or session name in Pi and h
occurs in n˜ (we use
∏
i Pi to denote P1 | P2 · · · | Pn).
Semantics. The reduction relation for networks is generated from the rules de-
fined in Fig. 5, which model the interactions of principals with the global queue.
Rule bREQc places an invitation to participate as role r in session s into the global
queue. Dually, in bACCc, a process receives an invitation on a shared name from
the global queue, assuming a message on a is to be routed to α. As a result, the
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[a〈s[r] : T 〉]α | 〈r ; h〉 −→ [0]α | 〈r ; h · a〈s[r] : T 〉〉 bREQc
[a(y[r] : T ).P ]α | 〈r ; a〈s[r] : T 〉 · h〉 −→ [P [s/y]]α | 〈r, s[r] 7→ α ; h〉† bACCc
[s[r1, r2]!lj〈v〉]α | 〈r ; h〉 −→ [0]α | 〈r ; h · s〈r1, r2, lj〈v〉〉〉 bSELc
[s[r1, r2]?{li(xi).Pi}i]α | 〈r ; s〈r1, r2, lj〈v〉〉 · h〉 −→ [Pj [v/xj ]]α | 〈r ; h〉†† bBRAc
[if tt then P else Q]α −→ [P ]α [if ff then P else Q]α −→ [Q]α bCNDc
[P ]α | N −→ [P ′]α | N ′
[E(P )]α | N −→ [E(P ′)]α | N ′
e −→ e′
[E(e)]α −→ [E(e′)]α
N −→ N ′
E(N) −→ E(N ′) bCTXc
† : r(a) = α †† : r(s[r2]) = α
E ::= ( ) | E | P | (νs)E | (νa)E | E ;P | E | N | if E then P else Q | s[r1, r2]!l〈E〉
Figure 5: Reduction for dynamic networks
routing table adds s[r] 7→ α in the entry for s. Rule bSELc puts in the queue a
message sent from r1 to r2, which selects label lj and carries v, if it is not going
to be routed to α (i.e. sent to self). Dually, bBRAc gets a message with label lj from
the global queue, so that the j-th process Pj receives value v. Rules bCTXc are for
a closure under the reduction context E . The other rules are standard.
The reduction is also defined modulo the structural congruence ≡ defined by
the standard laws over processes/networks, the unfolding of recursion (µX.P ≡
P [µX.P/X]) and the associativity and commutativity and the rules of message
permutation in the queue [33, 23]. The rules are summarised in Fig. 6 where
u ∈ {s, a}. The rule for message permutation is
m1 ·m2 y m2 ·m1
h·m1 ·m2 ·h′ ≡ h·m2 ·m1 ·h′
and uses the notion of message permutation given in Definition 3.1. The rule for
message permutation is needed to treat the inherent non-determinism arising in
message orders when three or more participants are involved. The other rules are
straightforward.
Definition 3.1 (Message permutation). For messages in the global queue, we
say messages m1 and m2 are permutable, denoted by m1 ·m2 y m2 ·m1, if they
satisfy one of the following conditions:
1. m1 = s〈r1, r2, l〈v〉〉 and m2 = s′〈r′1, r′2, l′〈v′〉〉, where s 6= s′, or (r1 6=
r′1 ∧ r2 6= r′2).
2. m1 = a〈s[r] : T 〉 and m2 = a′〈s′[r′] : T ′〉, where a 6= a′.
3. mi = a〈s[r] : T 〉 and mj = s′〈r′, r′′, l〈v〉〉 and i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j, where
s 6= s′, or (r 6= r′ ∧ r 6= r′′).
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P | 0 ≡ P P | Q ≡ Q | P (P | Q) | R ≡ P | (Q | R)
(ν u)P | Q ≡ (ν u)(P | Q) if u ∈ {s, a}, u 6∈ fn(Q) (ν uu′)P ≡ (ν u′u)P
(ν u)0 ≡ 0 P ≡ Q
[P ]α ≡ [Q]α (ν u)[0]α ≡ [0]α
N | [0]α ≡ N N1 | N2 ≡ N2 | N1 (N1 | N2) | N3 ≡ N1 | (N2 | N3)
(ν u)N1 | N2 ≡ (ν u)(N1 | N2) if u 6∈ fn(N2) (ν uu′)N ≡ (ν u′u)N
∅ · h ≡ h m1 ·m2 y m2 ·m1
h·m1 ·m2 ·h′ ≡ h·m2 ·m1 ·h′
r = r h ≡ h′
〈r ; h〉 ≡ 〈r′ ; h′〉
Figure 6: Structural congruence for networks
By (1) two interaction messages (i.e., in ongoing sessions) are permutable if they
are not related to the same session, or they are related to the same session but their
roles are different. By (2) two invitation messages are permutable if they are for
different principals. By (3) an invitation message and an interaction message are
permutable if they are for different sessions or the invited role r in the invitation
message is different from both the sender and receiver of the interaction message.
Example 3.1 (ATM: an implementation). We now illustrate the processes imple-
menting the client role of the ATM protocol. We let PC be the process implement-
ing TC (from Example 2.6) and communicating on session channel s.
PC = s[C,A]!Login(“alice pwd123”);
s[A,C]?{LoginOK();µX.P ′C, LoginFail().0}
P ′C = s[S,C]?Account(xb);P
′′
C
P ′′C = if getmore() ∧ (xb ≥ 10)
then s[C,S]!Withdraw(10);X
else s[C,S]!Quit();0
Note that PC selects only two of the possible branches (i.e., Withdraw and
Quit) and Deposit is never selected. One can think of PC as an ATM machine
that only allows to withdraw a number of £10 banknotes, until the amount exceeds
the current balance. This ATM machine does not allow deposits. We assume
getmore() to be a local function to the principal running PC that returns tt if more
notes are required, and ff otherwise. PS below implements the server role:
PS = s[A,S]?{LoginOK();µX.P ′S, LoginFail().0}
P ′S = s[S,C]!Account(getBalance());P
′′
S
P ′′S = s[C,S]?{Withdraw(xp).X,
Deposit(xd).X,
Quit().0 }
We assume that getBalance() is a function, local to the principal running PS, that
synchronously returns the current balance of the client.
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4. The Monitored Network: Semantics and Equivalences
In this section we formalise the specifications (based on local types) used to
guard the runtime behaviour of the principals in a network. These specifications
are the foundation of system monitors, each wrapping a principal to ensure that
the ongoing communication conforms to the given specification. Then, we present
a behavioural theory for monitored networks and their safety properties.
4.1. Semantics of Global Specifications
The specification of the (correct) behaviour of a principal consists of an as-
sertion environment 〈Γ; ∆〉, where Γ is the shared environment describing the
behaviour on shared channels, and ∆ is the session environment representing the
behaviour on session channels (i.e., describing the sessions that the principal is
currently participating in). The syntax of Γ and ∆ is given by:
Γ ::= ∅ | Γ, a : I(T [r]) | Γ, a : O(T [r]) ∆ ::= ∅ | ∆, s[r] :T
In Γ, the assignment a : I(T [r]) (resp. a : O(T [r])) states that the principal can,
through a, receive (resp. send) invitations to play role r in a session instance
specified by T . In ∆, we write s[r] : T when the principal is playing role r of
session s specified by T . A network is monitored with respect to collections of
specifications (later, just specifications) one for each principal in the network. A
specification Σ,Σ′, . . . is a finite map from principals to assertion environments:
Σ ::= ∅ | Σ, α :〈Γ; ∆〉
The semantics of Σ is defined using the following labels:
` ::= a〈s[r] :T 〉 |a〈s[r] :T 〉 |s[r1, r2]!l〈v〉 |s[r1, r2]?l〈v〉 |τ
The first two labels are for invitation actions, the first is for requesting and the sec-
ond is for accepting. Labels with s[r1, r2] indicate interaction actions for sending
(!) or receiving (?) messages within sessions. The labelled transition relation for
specifications is defined by the rules in Fig. 7 Rule [REQ] allows α to send an invi-
tation on a properly typed shared channel a (i.e., given that the shared environment
maps a to T [r]). Rule [ACC] allows α to receive an invitation to be role r in a new
session s, on a properly typed shared channel a. Rule [BRA] allows α, participating
to session s as r2, to receive a message with label lj from r1, given thatAj is satis-
fied after replacing xj with the received value v. After the application of this rule
the specification is Tj . Rule [SEL] is the symmetric (output) counterpart of [BRA].
We use ↓ to denote the evaluation of a logical assertion. [SPL] is the juxtaposition
of two session environments. [TAU] says that the specification should be invariant
under reduction of principals. [PAR] says if Σ1 and Σ3 are composable, after Σ1
becomes as Σ2, they are still composable.
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α :〈Γ, a : O(T [r]); ∆〉 a〈s[r]:T 〉−−−−−→ α :〈Γ, a : O(T [r]); ∆〉 [REQ]
s 6∈ dom(∆)
α :〈Γ, a : I(T [r]); ∆〉 a〈s[r]:T 〉−−−−−→ α :〈Γ, a : I(T [r]); ∆, s[r] :T 〉
[ACC]
Γ ` v :Sj , Aj [v/xj ] ↓ tt, j∈I
α :〈Γ; ∆, s[r2] :r1?{li(xi :Si){Ai}.Ti}i∈I〉 s[r1,r2]?lj〈v〉−−−−−−−−→ α :〈Γ; ∆, s[r2] :Tj [v/xj ]〉
[BRA]
Γ `v :Sj , Aj [v/xj ] ↓ tt, j∈I
α :〈Γ; ∆, s[r1] :r2!{li(xi :Si){Ai}.Ti}i∈I〉 s[r1,r2]!lj〈v〉−−−−−−−−→ α :〈Γ; ∆, s[r1] :Tj [v/xj ]〉
[SEL]
α :〈Γ1; ∆1〉 `−→ α :〈Γ′1; ∆′1〉







Figure 7: Labelled transition relation for specifications
4.2. Semantics of Dynamic Monitoring
The endpoint monitor M,M′, ... for principal α is a specification α : 〈Γ; ∆〉
used to dynamically ensure that the messages to and from α are legal with respect
to Γ and ∆. A monitored network N is a network N with monitors, obtained by
extending the syntax of networks as:
N ::= N | M | N | N | (νs)N | (νa)N
The reduction rules for monitored networks are given in Fig. 8 and use, in the
premises, the labelled transitions of monitors. The labelled transitions of a mon-
itor are the labelled transitions of its corresponding specification (given in § 4.1).
The first four rules model reductions that are allowed by the monitor (i.e., in
the premise). Rule dREQe inserts an invitation in the global queue. Rule dACCe is
symmetric and updates the router so that all messages for role r in session s will
be routed to α. Similarly, dBRAe (resp. dSELe) extracts (resp. introduces) messages
from (resp. in) the global queue. The error cases for dREQe and dSELe, namely
dREQERe and dSELERe, ‘skip’ the current action (removing it from the process), and
do not modify the queue, the router nor the state of the monitor. The error cases for
dACCe and dBRAe, namely dACCERe and dBRAERe, do not affect the process, which
remains ready to perform the action, and remove the violating message from the
queue.
Example 4.1 (ATM: a monitored network). We illustrate the monitored network
for the ATM scenario, where the routing table is defined as




[a〈s[r] : T 〉]α | M | 〈r ; h〉 −→ [0]α | M′ | 〈r ; h · a〈s[r] : T 〉〉
dACCe M
a〈s[r]:T 〉−−−−−→ M′ r(a) = α
[a(y[r] : T ).P ]α | M | 〈r ; a〈s[r] : T 〉 · h〉 −→ [P [s/y]]α | M′ | 〈r·s[r] 7→ α ; h〉
dBRAe M
s[r1,r2]?lj〈v〉−−−−−−−−→ M′ r(s[r2]) = α
[s[r1, r2]?{li(xi).Pi}i]α | M | 〈r ; s〈r1, r2, lj〈v〉〉 · h〉 −→ [Pj [v/xj ]]α | M′ | 〈r ; h〉
dSELe M
s[r1,r2]!l〈v〉−−−−−−−→ M′ r(s[r2]) 6= α
[s[r1, r2]!l〈v〉]α | M | 〈r ; h〉 −→ [0]α | M′ | 〈r ; h · s〈r1, r2, l〈v〉〉〉
dREQERe M 6
a〈s[r]:T 〉−−−−−→
[a〈s[r] : T 〉]α | M | 〈r ; h〉 −→ [0]α | M | 〈r ; h〉
dACCERe M 6
a〈s[r]:T 〉−−−−−→
[a(y[r] : T ).P ]α | M | 〈r ; a〈s[r] : T 〉 · h〉 −→ [a(y[r] : T ).P ]α | M | 〈r ; h〉
dBRAERe M 6
`−→ ` = s[r1, r2]?lj〈v〉
[s[r1, r2]?{li(xi).Pi}i]α | M | 〈r ; s〈r1, r2, lj〈v〉〉 · h〉 −→
[s[r1, r2]?{li(xi).Pi}i]α | M | 〈r ; h〉
dSELERe M 6
s[r1,r2]!l〈v〉−−−−−−−→
[s[r1, r2]!l〈v〉]α | M | 〈r ; h〉 −→ [0]α | M | 〈r ; h〉
Figure 8: Reduction for monitored networks (assume M = α :〈Γ; ∆〉).
We consider the fragment of session where the authentication has occurred, the
process of C (resp. S) is P ′C (resp. P
′




S]α | MS=[s[S,C]! Account〈100〉;P ′′S ]α | MS (assuming getBalance() = 100)
NC=[P
′
C]β | MC=[s[S,C]? Account(xb).P ′′C ]β | MC
NA=[0]γ | γ : 〈c : TA[A] ; s[A] : end〉
where MS = α : 〈a : TS[S] ; s[S] : C! Account(xb : int){xb ≥ 0}.T ′S〉 and MC is dual.
N1= [s[S,C]! Account〈100〉;P ′S]α | MS | [s[S,C]? Account(xb).P ′C]β | MC |NA | 〈r ; ∅〉
−→−→ [P ′S]α | M′S | [P ′C[100/xb]]β | M′C | NA | 〈r ; ∅〉
where M′S = α : 〈a :TS[S] ; s[S] : T ′S〉 and M′C = β : 〈b : TC[C] ; s[C] : T ′C〉
Above, xb ≥ 0 is satisfied since xb = 100. If the server tried to communicate e.g.,
value −100 for xb, then the monitor (by rule dSELERe) would drop the message.
Following Example 4.1, in the example that follows we show the different
behaviours of monitored and unmonitored processes.
Example 4.2 (Compare a monitored process to an unmonitored one.). Let
` = s[S,C]!Account〈−10〉
P1 = s[S,C]! Account〈−10〉;P ′S
MS = α : 〈a : TS[S] ; s[S] : C! Account(xb : int){xb ≥ 0}.T ′S〉
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The unmonitored principal [P1]α can make a step `, namely [P1]α
`−→. However,
the its monitored counter-part NS = [P1]α | MS cannot make a step ` (that is
NS 6 `−→) since the value −10 does not satisfy the predicate xb ≥ 0 attached to the
local type of the session monitored by MS.
Similarly, for type violations, consider:
` = s[S,C]!Account〈“hello”〉
P2 = s[S,C]! Account〈“hello”〉;P ′′S
then [P2]α
`−→ but [P2]α | MS 6 `−→.
4.3. Network Satisfaction and Equivalences
Based on the formal representations of monitored networks, we now intro-
duce the key formal tools for analysing their behaviour. Concretely, we introduce
two different equivalences to semantically compare networks: bisimulation and
barbed congruence (the latter relying on the notion of interface, also given in
this section). The two equivalences allow us to compare networks using different
granularities. On the one side, bisimilarity addresses mainly partial networks, and
gives an equivalence that distinguishes two networks containing different com-
ponents. On the other side, (barbed) congruence addresses networks (includ-
ing global transport) from the point of view of an external observer; thus, two
networks built from different components but offering the same service will be
equated. We choose to give two equivalences in order to give the theory a way to
compare session networks from two different points of views: bisimulation allows
designers to equate networks whose structures are similar, whereas barbed con-
gruence allows users to equate networks, seen as black boxes, which provide the
same service. Both equivalences are compositional, as proved in Proposition 4.4.
Finally, using the definition of congruence, we define the satisfaction relation
|= N . M, used in §5 and §7 to prove the properties of our framework.
Bisimulations. We first define semantics for networks of components, or partial
networks, on which we define bisimulation: we use M,M ′, ... for a partial net-
work, that is a network without a global transport, hence allowing the global ob-
servation of interactions. The labelled transition relation for processes and partial
networks M is defined in Fig. 9. In (CTX), n(`) indicates the names occurring in
` while bn(E) indicates binding induced by E . In (RES), sbj(`) denotes the subject
of `. In (TAU) the axiom is obtained either from the reduction rules for dynamic
networks given in § 3 (only those not involving the global transport), or from the
corresponding rules for monitored networks (which have been omitted in § 4.2).
Hereafter we write =⇒ for τ−→∗, `=⇒ for =⇒ `−→=⇒, and ˆ`=⇒ for =⇒ if ` = τ
and `=⇒ otherwise.
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(REQ) [a〈s[r] : T 〉;P ]α a〈s[r]:T 〉−−−−−→ [0]α (ACC) [a(y[r] : T ).P ]α a〈s[r]:T 〉−−−−−→ [P [s/y]]α
(BRA) [s[r1, r2]?{li(xi :Si).Pi}i]α s[r1,r2]?lj〈v〉−−−−−−−−→ [Pj [v/xj ]]α
(SEL) [s[r1, r2]!lj〈v〉]α s[r1,r2]!lj〈v〉−−−−−−−−→ [0]α (CTX) [P ]α
`−→ [P ′]α n(`) ∩ bn(E)=∅
[E(P )]α `−→ [E(P ′)]α








M ≡M0 `−→M ′0 ≡M ′
M
`−→M ′
Figure 9: Labelled transition relation for processes and partial networks
Definition 4.1 (Bisimulation over partial networks). A binary relation R over
partial networks is a weak bisimulation when M1RM2 implies: whenever M1 `−→
M ′1 such that bn(`) ∩ fn(M2) = ∅, we have M2
ˆ`
=⇒ M ′2 such that M ′1RM ′2, and
the symmetric case. We write M1 ≈M2 if (M1,M2) are in a weak bisimulation.
Interface. As stated above, we build another model where two different imple-
mentations of the same service are equated. Bisimilarity is too strong for this aim
as shown in further Example 4.3. We therefore introduce a contextual congruence
(barbed reduction-closed congruence [32]) ∼= for networks. Intuitively, two net-
works are barbed-congruent when they are indistinguishable for any principal that
connects to them. In this case we say that the two (barbed-congruent) networks
propose the same interface to the exterior. More precisely, two networks are re-
lated with ∼= when, composed with the same third network, they offer the same
barbs (i.e., the messages to external principals in the respective global queues are
on the same channels), and this property is preserved under reduction.
We say that a message m is routed for α in N if N = (νn˜)(M0 | 〈r ; h〉), m ∈
h, either m = a〈s[r] : T 〉 and r(a) = α or m = s[r1, r2]!l〈e〉 and r(s[r2]) = α.
Definition 4.2 (Barb). We write N ↓a when the global queue of N contains a
message m to free a, and m is routed for a principal not in N . We write N ⇓a if
N −→∗ N ′ ↓a.
We denote P(N) for the set of principals inN , that is P(∏[Pi]αi) = {α1, ..., αn}.
We say N1 and N2 are composable when P(N1) ∩ P(N2) = ∅, the union of their
routing tables remains a function, and their free session names are disjoint. If N1
and N2 are composable, we define N1 N2 = (νn˜1, n˜2)(M1 |M2 | 〈r1 ∪ r2 ; h1 ·
h2〉) where Ni = (νn˜i)(Mi | 〈ri ; hi〉) (i = 1, 2).
Definition 4.3 (Barbed reduction-closed congruence). A relationR on networks
with the same principals is a barbed r.c. congruence [32] if the following holds:
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whenever N1RN2 we have: (1) for each composable N , N  N1RN  N2; (2)
N1 −→ N ′1 implies N2 −→∗ N ′2 s.t. N ′1RN ′2 again, and the symmetric case; (3)
N ′1 ⇓a iff N ′2 ⇓a. We write N1 ∼= N2 when N1 and N2 are related by a barbed r.c.
congruence.
Properties. The following result states that composing two bisimilar partial net-
works with the same network – implying the same router and global transport –
yields two undistinguishable networks.
Proposition 4.4 (Congruency). If M1 ≈ M2, then (1) M1|M ≈ M2|M for each
composable partial network M ; and (2) M1|N ∼= M2|N for each composable
network N .
Proof. For (1) we show that the relation
R = {(M1|M, M2|M) |M1 ≈M2, M composable with M1 and M2}
is a bisimulation. Suppose (M1|M)R(M2|M) and M1|M `−→M1. We discuss the
shape of M1:
• If M1 = M ′1|M , it means that M1 `−→ M ′1. By definition of R, M2
ˆ`
=⇒ M ′2
and M ′1 ≈M ′2, we conclude.
• If M1 = M1|M ′, it means that M `−→M ′. It is easy to conclude.
By examining the reduction rule associated to parallel composition, we observe
that no reduction is induced through interactions between the two networks. Hence
we have covered all cases. The symmetric case (when M2|M `−→M2) is similar.
To prove (2) we proceed by showing that
R = {((νn˜)(M1|N), (νn˜)(M2|N)) |M1 ≈M2, N composable with M1 and M2}
is a barbed congruence. First, R is clearly a congruence since it is closed under
composition. Second, for (2), we take a composable N ′. We have N ′  (Mi|N) =
Mi|(N ′  N) for i ∈ {1, 2}. We use the definition of R to conclude. For (3),
assume M1|N −→ N1.
• If N1 = M1|N ′, it means that N −→ N ′. We use the definition of R to
conclude.
• If N1 = M ′1|N ′, it means that N = M0|〈r ; ` ·H〉, N = M ′0|〈r ; H〉
and M1
`−→ M ′1. We deduce N2 = M ′2|N ′, with N = M0|〈r ; ` ·H〉,
N = M ′0|〈r ; H〉 and M2 `−→M ′2. We use the definition ofR to conclude.
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• If the reduction is induced by interaction between M1 and N , then M2 has
the corresponding action, hence we can reason in the same way, hence done.
For (2), we suppose that (M1|N) ⇓`. Two cases can occur:
• Either N ⇓` and it follows directly that (M2|N) ⇓`.
• orM1 `−→M ′1 and by definition ofR,M2 `=⇒M ′2, meaning that (M2|N) ⇓a.
The symmetric case is similar.
By definition this shows ≈⊂∼=.
Example 4.3 (Example of Equivalence). We give here an example illustrating our
equivalences of networks. Consider the following networks:
M ′0 = [a1(y1[C] : TC).y1[C,A]!〈Login(xi)〉.y1[A,C]?LoginOK().PLOOP,C]α1
M ′1 = [a2(y2[S] : TS).PLOOP,S]α2
| [(νs) a1〈s[C] : TC〉 | a2〈s[S] : TS〉 | a3〈s[A] : TA〉
| a3(y3[A] : TA).y3[C,A]?(Login(xi)).y3[A,S]!〈LoginOk()〉.PLOOP,A]β
M ′2 = [a2(y2[S] : TS).PLOOP,S]α2
| [a4(y4[DB] : TDB).y4[A, DB]?(Query).y4[DB,A]!〈Answer〉]γ
| [(νs) (a1〈s[C] : TC〉 | a2〈s[S] : TS〉 | a3〈s[A] : TA〉 | a4〈s[DB] : TDB〉)
| a3(y3[A] : T ′A).y3[C,A]?(Login(xi)).
y3[A, DB]!〈Query〉.y3[DB,A]?(Answer).PLOOP,A]β
N ′1 = M
′
1 | 〈a1 7→ α1, a2 7→ α2, a3 7→ β ; ∅〉
N ′2 = (νa4) (M
′
2 | 〈a1 7→ α1, a2 7→ α2, a3 7→ β, a4 7→ γ ; ∅〉)
Our networks implement the ATM example defined in 2.1. For the sake of
clarity, we have to take the following shortcuts: (1) we only consider the login
phase of the protocol, the LOOP phase is abstracted into three processes PLOOP,C,
PLOOP,A, PLOOP,S for the three different roles, (2) to lighten the notations, we do not
make the logical annotations explicit, (3) as a result of (2), we do not implement
login validation and only write the case were the login succeeds.
We present two different networks N ′1 and N
′
2, both are implementing the
Server-Authenticator part of the ATM protocol. The Server part is the same in
both processes (executed at principal α2), but the Authenticator part (executed at
β) is different: N ′1 implements straightforwardly the protocol while N
′
2 contains
another indirection involving a fourth participant (executed at γ): the Authentica-
tor sends a query to a Database to retrieve additional information required in the
login process, and the Database answers.
Thus, the protocols implemented in both networks are different, as one in-
volves three participants and the other one four. Yet, the query to the Database
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is N ′2 is unobservable from the outside, and an external client, such as N
′
0 cannot
distinguish between N ′1 and N
′
2.
This is captured by our equivalences: the two partial networks M ′1 and M
′
2 do
not contain the same components, and as a result, are not bisimilar: after some
steps, M ′2 is able to emit on the channel a4, which is impossible for M
′
1. How-
ever, when encapsulated into dynamic networks N ′1 and N
′
2, they are barbed r.c.
congruent: they will offer it the same interface to the same external client.
Satisfaction. We finally present a satisfaction relation for partial networks that
include local principals. IfM is a partial network, |= M .Σ s.t. dom(Σ) = P(M),
it means that: the specification Σ allows all the outputs from the network; the
network M is ready to receive all the inputs indicated by the specification; and
this is preserved by transition.
Definition 4.5 (Satisfaction). Let sbj(`) denote the subject of ` 6= τ . A relation
R from partial networks to specifications is a satisfaction when MRΣ implies:
1. If Σ `−→ Σ′ for an input ` and M has an input at sbj(`), then M `−→ M ′ s.t.
M ′RΣ′.
2. If M `−→M ′ for an output at `, then Σ `−→ Σ′ s.t. M ′RΣ′.
3. If M τ−→M ′, then Σ τ−→ Σ′ s.t. M ′RΣ′ (i.e. M ′RΣ since Σ τ−→ Σ always).
When MRΣ for a satisfaction relationR, we say M satisfies Σ, denoted |= M .
Σ. By Definition 4.5 and Proposition 4.4 we obtain:
Proposition 4.6 (Satisfaction). If M1 ∼= M2 and |= M1 . Σ then |= M2 . Σ.
That is, if two networks present the same interface, they satisfy the same specifi-
cations.
5. Safety Assurance in Partial Networks
In this section, we present the properties underpinning safety assurance in
partial networks, that are networks without a global transport. By considering
partial networks we focus on the properties of principals (and their respective
monitors) with respect to specifications, abstracting from the routing mechanisms.
The routing mechanisms will be taken into account in later sections. We first
consider networks consisting of single monitored principals (local safety) and then
extend the results to partial networks in general (global safety).
Recall that: partial networks are networks without global transport;M denotes
an unmonitored partial network; N denotes an unmonitored network; N denotes
a (monitored or unmonitored) network. Monitors, ranged over by M, are specifi-
cations (of the form α : 〈Γ; ∆〉) used for dynamic verification. See Table 5 for a
summary of the notation.
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M monitor specification used for monitoring
M unmonitored partial network without M, without 〈r ; h〉
N unmonitored network without M, with 〈r ; h〉
N network with or without M, with 〈r ; h〉
Table 1: Networks: summary of the notations
The partial network composed by a principal guarded by its monitor can take
any action expected by the specification:
Lemma 5.1. For any principal [P ]α, specification α : 〈Γ,∆〉, and action `, if
α : 〈Γ,∆〉 `−→ α : 〈Γ′,∆′〉 and [P ]α `−→ [P ′]α, then [P ]α | α : 〈Γ,∆〉 `−→ [P ′]α | α :
〈Γ′,∆′〉.
Proof. Direct, as no interaction can appear between [P ]α and its monitor with
specification α : 〈Γ,∆〉 when ` is performed. 
Local safety ensures that a monitored process always behaves well with re-
spect to the specification used to define its monitor.
Theorem 5.2 (Local safety). |= [P ]α | M . α : 〈Γ; ∆〉 with M = α :〈Γ; ∆〉.
Proof. We define a relation R as:
R = {([P ]α | M, α : 〈Γ; ∆〉) | M = α :〈Γ; ∆〉}
Assume ([P0]α′ | M0, α′ : 〈Γ0,∆0〉) ∈ R:
1. For an input `, because M0 = α′ : 〈Γ0,∆0〉 by assumption, that α′ :
〈Γ0,∆0〉 `−→ α′ : 〈Γ′0,∆′0〉 and [P0]α′ | M0 having an input at sbj(`) to-
gether imply that [P0]α′
`−→ [P ′0]α′ , thus by Lemma 5.1, we have [P0]α′ |
α′ : 〈Γ0,∆0〉 `−→ [P ′0]α′ | M′0, and M′0 = α′ : 〈Γ′0,∆′0〉. Thus we have
([P ′0]α′ | M′0, α′ : 〈Γ′0,∆′0〉) ∈ R.
2. For an output `, [P0]α′ | M0 `−→ [P ′0]α′ | M′0 implies M0 = α′ : 〈Γ0,∆0〉 `−→
α′ : 〈Γ′0,∆′0〉 = M′0. Thus we have ([P ′0]α′ | M′0, α′ : 〈Γ′0,∆′0〉) ∈ R.
3. For an τ , [P0]α′ | M0 τ−→ [P0]α′ | M0 implies that M0 = α′ : 〈Γ0,∆0〉 τ−→ α′ :
〈Γ0,∆0〉 = M0.
Therefore, by Definition 4.5, R is a satisfaction relation and |= [P ]α | M .
α : 〈Γ; ∆〉 with M = α :〈Γ; ∆〉. 
We define a safety property for partial networks that may include multiple
principals. It describes the fact that a monitored network satisfies its specification.
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Definition 5.3 (Network global safety). M | M is globally safe with respect to
Σ if and only if |= M | M . Σ.
We introduce a condition on the structure of a network and on its monitors,
which guarantees global safety. A partial network is fully monitored w.r.t. Σ
when all its principals are monitored and the collection of the monitors is weakly
bisimilar to Σ. Formally, M | M is fully monitored w.r.t. Σ when M | M ≡
[P1]α1 | M1 | . . . | [Pn]αn | Mn for some n ≥ 0 and M1, . . . ,Mn≈Σ. By Theorem
5.4 a fully monitored network is globally safe. Theorem 5.4 justifies monitoring
by ensuring that fully monitored systems behave as expected.
Theorem 5.4 (Global safety). If M | M is fully monitored w.r.t. Σ, then |= M |
M . Σ.
Proof. Assume N is composed by monitored endpoints [Pi]αi | Mi, i ∈ {1, ..., n}.
M | M ≡ [P1]α1 | M1 | ... | [Pn]αn | Mn
where Mi = αi : 〈Γi; ∆i〉 for i = {1, ..., n}, Σ = M1, ...,Mn. Based on Theorem
5.2, for each i ∈ {1, ..., n},
|= [Pi]αi | Mi . αi :〈Γi; ∆i〉
with Mi = αi :〈Γi; ∆i〉. By Definition 4.5 and induction, we have
[P1]α1 | M1 | ... | [Pn]αn | Mn . α1 :〈Γ1; ∆1〉, ..., αn :〈Γn; ∆n〉
so that |= M | M . Σ. 
6. Transparency of Monitored Networks
Whereas safety assurance focuses on preventing violations from the principals,
transparency ensures that monitors do not affect the behaviour of well-behaved
principals. We first consider transparency for partial networks consisting of one
single principal (local transparency) and then extend the result to monitored net-
works with global transport.
Theorem 6.1 (Local transparency). If |= [P ]α . α : 〈Γ; ∆〉, then [P ]α ≈ ([P ]α |
M) with M = α : 〈Γ; ∆〉.
That is, a correct participant is not impaired by monitoring.
Proof. Define a relation R as:
R = {([P ]α, [P ]α | M) | |= [P ]α . α :〈Γ; ∆〉}
Assume ([P ]α, [P ]α | M) ∈ R,
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• for an output ` (the case for τ is similar), [P ]α `−→ [P ′]α implies M `−→ M′
due to |= [P ]α . M; by Lemma 5.1, we have [P ]α | M `−→ [P ′]α | M′;
• for an input `, [P ]α `−→ [P ′]α only when M `−→ M′, which together imply
that, by Lemma 5.1, [P ]α | M `−→ [P ′]α | M′.
By Definition 4.5, we have |= [P ′]α . M′, so that ([P ′]α, [P ′]α | M′) ∈ R.
Symmetrically, since, by Theorem 5.2, we have |= [P ]α | M . α : 〈Γ; ∆〉 with
M = α :〈Γ; ∆〉,
• for an output ` or τ , [P ]α | M `−→ [P ′]α | M′ implies M `−→ M′ whenever
[P ]α
`−→ [P ′]α;
• for an input `, [P ]α | M `−→ [P ′]α | M′ says M `−→ M′, which implies
[P ]α
`−→ [P ′]α.
By Definition 4.5, we have |= [P ′]α | M′ . M′, so that ([P ′]α | M′, [P ′]α) ∈ R. By
Definition 4.1, [P ]α ≈ ([P ]α | M) with M = α :〈Γ; ∆〉. 
By Proposition 4.4 and Theorem 6.1, we derive Corollary 6.2 stating that
weakly bisimilar static networks combined with the same global transport are
weakly bisimilar; i.e. monitoring does not affect routing of information to and
from a correct principal.
Corollary 6.2 (Bisimilarity). If |= [P ]α . α : 〈Γ; ∆〉, then for any 〈r ; h〉, we
have ([P ]α | 〈r ; h〉) ≈ ([P ]α | M | 〈r ; h〉) with M = α :〈Γ; ∆〉.
Global transparency (Theorem 6.3) states a collection of specifications (mon-
itors) does not alter the behaviour of a well-behaved networks. We consider net-
works with global transport to ensure that the correctness of the network is not
altered during the routing of messages. Observe that the reduction relation for
networks introduced in Fig. 5 models interactions with the global transport as
invisible actions. In order to enable the observation of the behaviour of a network
together with the dynamics of its global transport h we introduce a new set of
rules for the labelled transitions of networks, denoted by `−→g, and presented in
Fig. 10. The transitions in Fig. 10 allow us to globally observe, for example, that
a message sent by [P ]α enters the global transport:
〈r ; h〉 s[r1,r2]!lj〈v〉−−−−−−−→g 〈r ; h·s〈r1, r2, lj〈v〉〉〉
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{REQ} 〈r ; h〉 a〈s[r]:T 〉−−−−−→g 〈r ; h·a〈s[r] : T 〉〉
{ACC} 〈r ; a〈s[r] : T 〉·h〉 a〈s[r]:T 〉−−−−−→g 〈r ; h〉
{SEL} 〈r ; h〉 s[r1,r2]!l〈v〉−−−−−−→g 〈r ; h· s〈r1, r2, l〈v〉〉〉
{BRA} 〈r ; s〈r1, r2, l〈v〉〉·h〉 s[r1,r2]?l〈v〉−−−−−−−→g 〈r ; h〉
{NET}N=[P ]α | 〈r ; h〉 [P ]α
`−→ [P ′]α 〈r ; h〉 `−→g 〈r′ ; h′〉 N ′=[P ′]α | 〈r′ ; h′〉
N
`−→g N ′












`−→g N ′1 bn(`) ∩ fn(N2) = ∅ dest(`) 6∈ P(N2)
N1 ‖ N2 `−→g N ′1 | N2
{MON}N = N | M N
`−→g N ′ M `−→ M′ N′ = N ′ | M′
N
`−→g N′
Figure 10: LTS for networks
Similarly, the parallel composition of a principal sending s[r1, r2]!lj〈v〉 and the
global transport is made visible as follows:
[s[r1, r2]!lj〈v〉;P ′]α | 〈r ; h〉 s[r1,r2]!lj〈v〉−−−−−−−→g [P ′]α | h·s〈r1, r2, lj〈v〉〉
We define dest as a partial function mapping a label, which representing an
action, to its destination as:
dest ::= a〈s[r] :T 〉 7→ a | a〈s[r] :T 〉 7→ a
| s[r1, r2]!l〈v〉 7→ s[r2] | s[r1, r2]?l〈v〉 7→ s[r2]
The notation of global observable transition `−→g, used to denote globally observ-
able action `, is defined by the rules in Fig. 10. Rules {REQ} and {ACC} (resp.
{SEL} and {BRA}) are for inserting and removing invitation messages (resp. mes-
sages in established sessions) from the global transport. Rules {ACC} and {BRA}
represent that, as a message leaves the global queue, there should be a local prin-
cipal receiving it as an input. Similarly, rules {REQ} and {SEL} represent that, as
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a message enters the global queue, there should be a local principal outputting
it to the queue. By {NET} for unmonitored networks, as N `−→g N ′, it means
∃[P ]α ∈ N , [P ]α `−→ [P ′]α (i.e. locally visible) such that 〈r ; h〉 `−→g 〈r′ ; h′〉 (i.e.
globally visible). Rule {TAU} summarizes the reduction rules defined in Section
3. Rule {RES} and {STR} are standard. Rule {PAR} says that, the bound names of
action ` should not be any free name appearing in networkN2, and it should not be
absorbed by any process in network N2 (i.e. its destination is not in N2). By rule
{MON} for monitored networks, N `−→g N′ means ∃[P ]α | M ∈ N, [P ]α `−→ [P ′]α
and M `−→ M′ (i.e. locally visible) such that 〈r ; h〉 `−→g 〈r′ ; h′〉 (i.e. globally
visible).
Theorem 6.3 (Global transparency). Assume N and N have the same global
transport 〈r ; h〉. If N is fully monitored w.r.t. Σ and N = M | 〈r ; h〉 is
unmonitored but |= M . Σ, then we have N ≈ N .
Proof. Define a relation R:
R = {N, N | N = M | 〈r ; h〉 and |= M . Σ}
We prove that R is a standard strong bisimilar relation over `−→g. Note that, M . Σ
means ∀[Pi]αi ∈M , we have αi : 〈Γi; ∆i〉 ∈ Σ and |= [Pi]αi : αi : 〈Γi; ∆i〉.
1. As N `−→g N′, it implies ∃[Pj]αj | Mj ∈ N, [Pj]αj `−→ [P ′j ]αj and Mj `−→ M′j
such that 〈r ; h〉 `−→g 〈r′ ; h′〉, and other monitored processes in N are
not affected. When ` is an input, by Definition 4.5, since |= M . Σ, we
should have [Pj]αj
`−→ [P ′j ]αj ; when ` is an output or a τ action, by Def-
inition 4.5, the transition of [Pj]αj
`−→ [P ′j ]αj is able to take place. Both
cases lead to M `−→ M ′ and 〈r ; h〉 `−→g 〈r′ ; h′〉 so that N = M |
〈r ; h〉 `−→g M ′ | 〈r′ ; h′〉 = N ′, and |= [P ′]αj : αj : 〈Γ′j; ∆′j〉 by
Definition 4.5. αj : 〈Γ′j; ∆′j〉 is the resulting new configuration of αj in
Σ. Other specifications {αi : 〈Γi; ∆i〉}i∈I\{j} ∈ Σ are not affected. Let
Σ′ = αj : 〈Γ′j; ∆′j〉, {αi : 〈Γi; ∆i〉}i∈I\{j}. Therefore, for the resulting
new network N ′ = M ′ | 〈r′ ; h′〉, we have |= M ′ . Σ′. Thus we have
(N′, N ′) ∈ R.
2. For the symmetric case, as N `−→g N ′, it implies ∃[Pj]αj ∈ N , [Pj]αj `−→
[P ′j ]αj such that 〈r ; h〉 `−→g 〈r′ ; h′〉 and other processes in N are not af-
fected. Since |= M . Σ, without loss of generality, let Mj = αj : 〈Γj; ∆j〉,
then we have, for any `, [Pj]αj | Mj `−→ [P ′j ]αj | M′j , where M′j = αj :
〈Γ′j; ∆′j〉. It makes 〈r ; h〉 `−→g 〈r′ ; h′〉, so that N `−→g N′. Since N′
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is a fully monitored network, its static part (i.e. the part when the global
transport is taken off from N′), say [Pi]αi | {Mi}i∈I where {Mi}i∈I =
αj : 〈Γ′j; ∆′j〉, {αi : 〈Γi; ∆i〉}i∈I\{j}, |= [Pi]αi | {Mi}i∈I : Σ′ where
Σ′ = αj : 〈Γ′j; ∆′j〉, {αi : 〈Γi; ∆i〉}i∈I\{j}. Thus we have (N ′,N′) ∈ R.

By Theorems 5.4 and 6.3, we can mix unmonitored principals with monitored
principals still obtaining global safety assurance:
Corollary 6.4 (Mixed Network). If M | M is fully monitored with respect to Σ,
|= M ′ . Σ, and P(M) ∩ P(M ′) = ∅, then |= (M | M) |M ′ . Σ.
In the above corollary, untypedM is monitored by M which specifies Σ, while
M ′ is unmonitored but statically checked to conform to Σ. The result shows that
they can safely be composed.
7. Session Fidelity
The property of session fidelity says that, whenever all the principals in a
static network conform to their specifications, then all of the derivatives of this
static network conform to evolutions of the initial global specification.
Global Safety vs Session Fidelity. Recall that global safety (Definition 5.3) only
ensures that in a network where principals are well-behaved with respect to their
local types, all interactions conform to the collection of these local types. Session
fidelity is a stronger property than global safety (Definition 5.3) as illustrated in
Example 7.1.
Example 7.1. Consider a simple global type
G = r1 → r2 : {l1(x1){x1 > 9}.G1, l2(x2){x2 < 10}.G2}
and processes P and Q implementing roles r1 and r2 in established session s
P = s[r1, r2]!l1〈10〉.P ′
Q = s[r1, r2]?{li(xi).Qi}i∈{1,2}
Suppose that during runtime P sends out message s〈r1, r2, l1〈10〉〉 but,Q receives
a message, perhaps revised by an attack, s〈r1, r2, l2〈8〉〉. These actions satisfy
global safety since satisfy the specifications of P and Q, namely they are locally
well-behaved. This scenario (i.e., the content of the message being modified be-
tween a send and a corresponding receive action) does not conform to the intended
global protocol. We define a property, session fidelity, that rules out the scenario
above (Definition 7.8) and prove (Theorem 7.13) that fully monitored networks
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with global transport satisfy session fidelity. This is due to the fact that: (1) s is a
private session ID that can be viewed only by the participants in the session, (2) all
principals are guarded by monitors hence all messages reaching the global trans-
port are valid, and (3) the global transport preserves the values of the messages it
gets.
Configurations. We define session fidelity after giving the labelled transition re-
lation for configurations, and a few auxiliary definitions.
Definition 7.2 (Configuration). A configuration is denoted by Φ = Σ; 〈r ; h〉,
where all messages corresponding to the actions guarded by Σ are in h.
A configuration guides the global behaviours in a network. By including the
global queue, we let configuration capture the global behaviour in a network,
which accounts also for the correct routing and dispatch of messages. Before
giving the semantics of configurations, it will be useful to define when and how
configurations can be composed. Let P(Φ) be the set of principals involving in Φ.
Definition 7.3 (Parallel composition of configurations). Let Φ1 = Σ1; 〈r1 ; h1〉
and Φ2 = Σ2 ; 〈r2 ; h2〉 be configurations. We say that Φ1 and Φ2 are composable
whenever P(Φ1) ∩ P(Φ2) = ∅ and the union of their routing tables remains a
function. If Φ1 and Φ2 are composable, then we define the composition of Φ1 and
Φ2 as: Φ1  Φ2 = Σ1,Σ2 ; 〈r1 ∪ r2 ; h1 ·h2〉.
The formal semantics of configurations is defined by the LTS in Fig. 11. The
behaviour of each principal in a network is guided by the specification Σ, and is
observed by the global transport 〈r ; h〉. Except rules [Acc] and [Par], all rules
are straightforward from the LTS of specifications (defined in Section 4.1) and the
one of dynamic networks (Fig. 10). We comment below on the interesting rules.
1. Rule [Acc] indicates that, only when the invitation has been (internally)
accepted by a principal in the network, the routing information registers
s[r] 7→ α. When we observe the global transport (externally), we only
observe that an invitation is moved out from the global queue (which implies
that it has been accepted). However, we do not know who accepts it. Only
Σ tells which principal accepts this invitation, so that we can register it in
the routing information using α.
2. Rule [Par] says if Φ1 and Φ3 are composable (Definition 7.3), after Φ1 be-
comes as Φ2, they are still composable.
Our framework relies on two structural (well-formedness) properties on speci-
fications: consistency and coherence. Consistent specifications are the ones corre-
sponding to well-formed concrete systems (i.e., where the session initiation proce-
dures are well-regulated, and where the active sessions correspond to projections




Σ ; 〈r ; h〉 a〈s[r]:T 〉−−−−−→g Σ′ ; 〈r ; h·a〈s[r] : T 〉〉
[Acc] α :〈Γ, a : I(T [r]); ∆〉 ∈ Σ Σ
a〈s[r]:T 〉−−−−−→ Σ′
Σ ; 〈r ; a〈s[r] : T 〉·h〉 a〈s[r]:T 〉−−−−−→g Σ′ ; 〈r, s[r] 7→ α ; h〉
[Sel] Σ
s[r1,r2]!l〈v〉−−−−−−→ Σ′
Σ ; 〈r ; h〉 s[r1,r2]!l〈v〉−−−−−−→g Σ′ ; 〈r ; h·s〈r1, r2, l〈v〉〉〉
[Bra] Σ
s[r1,r2]?l〈v〉−−−−−−−→ Σ′




Φ1  Φ3 `−→g Φ2  Φ3
[Tau] Σ
τ−→ Σ
Σ; 〈r ; h〉 τ−→g Σ; 〈r ; h〉
Figure 11: Labelled transition relation for configurations
Definition 7.4 (Consistent and coherent specifications). Σ = {αi :〈Γi; ∆i〉}i∈I
is consistent when
1. there is one and only one i such that Γi ` a : I(T [r]), and
2. as long as a : O(T [r]) exists in some Γi, ∃Γj such that a : I(T [r]) ∈ Γj; and
3. for any s appearing in any ∆j , if {s[rk] : Tk}1≤k≤n is a collection appeared
in {∆i}i∈I , there exists well-formed G such that roles(G) = {r1, .., rn} and
G  ri = Ti.
Two specifications Σ1 and Σ2 are coherent when their union is a consistent speci-
fication.
Next, we define receivability, configurational consistency and conformance
for configurations, which are based on the LTS of configurations and dynamic
networks. Receivability entices the ability for a message in transit to reach its
destination.
Definition 7.5 (Receivable configuration). Receivability of a configuration Σ; 〈r ; h〉
is defined by the following induction:
1. If h is empty then Σ; 〈r ; h〉 is receivable.
2. If h ≡ m·h′, then Σ; 〈r ; h〉 is receivable when we have Σ; 〈r ; m·h′〉 `−→g
Σ′; 〈r′ ; h′〉, where ` corresponding to m, and Σ′; 〈r′ ; h′〉 is receivable.
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A configuration Σ; 〈r ; h〉 is configurationally consistent if all of its multi-step
global input transition derivatives can be performed and the resulting specifica-
tions Σ is consistent (according to Definition 7.4).
Definition 7.6 (Configurational consistency). A configuration Φ = Σ; 〈r ; h〉 is
configurationally consistent whenever
1. h is empty and Σ is consistent, or
2. h is not empty, Σ; 〈r ; h〉 is receivable, and after receiving all messages in
h with Σ `1...`n−−−→ Σ′ (by the LTS in Figure 7), where `i, i = {1, ..., n} are
inputs and, ∀m ∈ h, ∃` ∈ `1 . . . `n such that ` corresponds to m, we have
Σ′ is consistent.
In other words, Σ; 〈r ; h〉 is configurationally consistent if, in each of its deriva-
tives, all messages in the transport can be “received” by some monitors in Σ and,
after absorbing all these messages, the resulting Σ′ is still consistent. Confor-
mance links networks and configurations.
Definition 7.7 (Conformance to a configuration). Assume a network N ≡M |
〈r ; h〉 is given. We say that N conforms to Σ; 〈r ; h〉 when:
1. h is empty, |= M . Σ and Σ is consistent, or
2. h is not empty, and the following conditions hold
(a) |= M . Σ,
(b) all messages in h are receivable to M , and
(c) as Σ; 〈r ; h〉 `1...`n−−−→g Σ′; 〈r′ ; ∅〉 so that M | h `1...`n−−−→g M ′ | ∅ where
each `i, i = {1, ..., n} is an input, Σ′ is consistent.
Session Fidelity. Session fidelity describes the relation between a network and
the configuration specifying it: all evolutions of the network should correspond to
expected evolutions of the configuration which does not lead to ill-formed config-
urations. We now give the formal definition of session fidelity.
Definition 7.8 (Session fidelity). Assume configuration Σ; 〈r ; h〉 is configura-
tionally consistent. We say that N satisfies session fidelity w.r.t. Σ; 〈r ; h〉 if and
only if, for any `, N `−→g N ′ implies Σ; 〈r ; h〉 `−→g Σ′; 〈r′ ; h′〉 and Σ′; 〈r′ ; h′〉 is
configurationally consistent and N ′ satisfies session fidelity w.r.t. Σ′; 〈r′ ; h′〉.
Before proving session fidelity for our monitored framework we give a few
auxiliary lemmas. Lemma 7.9 states that, as a network conforms to some configu-
rationally consistent configuration, the evolution of the configuration must be able
to consume an output occurrence in the network:
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Lemma 7.9. Assume a network N ≡ M |〈r ; h〉 conforms to Σ; 〈r ; h〉, and that
Σ; 〈r ; h〉 is configurationally consistent. If N `−→g N ′ with ` being an output and
Σ; 〈r ; h〉 `−→g Σ′; 〈r ; h·m〉, then Σ′; 〈r ; h·m〉 is receivable.
Proof. We only show the interesting case. When ` = a〈s[r] : T 〉, since Σ is
consistent, by Definitions 7.4, there exists a : I(T [r]) in some Γ of Σ. Because `
does not affect the existence of a : I(T [r]), it remains in Γ of Σ′, thus invitation
m = a〈s[r] : T 〉 is receivable to Σ′.
Let αi = 〈Γi,∆i〉. When ` = s[r1, r2]!lj〈v〉, by Definitions 7.4 and 7.7, since
|= M . Σ and Σ is consistent, ∃αs, αr ∈ Σ, ∃G is well-formed of the form
G = r1 → r2 : {li(xi : (T [r])i){Ai}.Gi}i∈I
such that s obeys to G:
∆s(s[r1]) = G  r1 = r2!{li(xi : (T [r])i){Ai}.Gi  r1}i∈I
∆r(s[r2]) = G  r2 = r1?{li(xi : (T [r])i){A′i}.Gi  r2}i∈I (1)
As action s[r1, r2]!lj〈v〉 fires, Equation 1 changes to
∆s(s[r1]) = Gj  r1
∆r(s[r2]) = G  r2 = r1?{li(xi : (T [r])i){A′i}.Gi  r2}i∈I
the receiving capability of r1? still remains in ∆r(s[r2]), where αr ∈ Σ′, thus
m = s〈r1, r2, lj〈v〉〉 is receivable to Σ′.
As N ≡ M | H and |= M . Σ, the satisfaction relation of M and Σ remains
whenever action takes place.
Lemma 7.10 says that, if the static part of a network satisfies a specification,
then the evolution of the static part still satisfies the corresponding evolution of
the specification.
Lemma 7.10. Assume N ≡ M | H and |= M . Σ. If N `−→g N ′ ≡ M ′ | H ′ and
Σ
`−→ Σ′, then |= M ′ . Σ′.
Proof. Directly from Definition 4.5.
Finally, Lemma 7.12 states that, if a network conforms to a configurationally
consistent configuration, then any evolution of the network conforms to the corre-
sponding evolution of the configuration, which is still configurationally consistent.
Lemma 7.12 relier on the definition of routing table given below.
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Definition 7.11 (Routing table). . We define route(Σ), the routing table derived
from Σ, as follows:
route(α : 〈Γ; ∆, s[r] : T 〉,Σ) = s[r] 7→ α, route(α : 〈Γ; ∆〉,Σ)
route(α : 〈Γ, a : I(T [r]); ∆〉,Σ) = a 7→ α, route(α : 〈Γ; ∆〉,Σ)
route(α : 〈Γ, a : O(T [r]); ∆〉,Σ) = route(α : 〈Γ; ∆〉,Σ)
The routing table is used to observe inputs. Note that by Definition 7.4 (2), as long
as Σ is consistent, the existence of a : O(T [r]) in Γ implies that the corresponding
a : I(T [r]) is also in Γ.
Lemma 7.12. Assume configuration Σ; 〈r ; h〉 is configurationally consistent,
and network N ≡ M |〈r ; h〉 conforms to configuration Σ; 〈r ; h〉. Then for any
`, whenever we have N `−→g N ′ such that Σ; 〈r ; h〉 `−→g Σ′; 〈r′ ; h′〉, it holds that
Σ′; 〈r′ ; h′〉 is configurationally consistent and that N ′ conforms to Σ′; 〈r′ ; h′〉.
Proof. Assume N conforms to Σ; 〈r ; h〉, which is configurationally consistent.
We prove the statement by inspection of each case.
(Sel) Let ` = s[r1, r2]!lj〈v〉, N `−→g N ′ and Σ; 〈route(Σ) ; h〉 `−→g Σ′; 〈r ; h·m〉,
where m = s〈r1, r2, lj〈v〉〉.
Then r = route(Σ) = route(Σ′) because there is no change to the elements
in Σ or to the routing table.
Since Σ allows ` and Σ is consistent, then ∃αr, αs ∈ Σ, and ∃Gwell-formed
of the form
G = r1 → r2{li(xi : Si){Ai}.Gi}i∈I ,
such that
∆s(s[r1]) = G  r1 = r2!{li(xi : Si){Ai}.Gi  r1}i∈I ,
∆r(s[r2]) = G  r2 = r1?{li(xi : Si){A′i}.Gi  r2}i∈I .
Σ
`−→ Σ′ implies Σ′ has
∆s(s[r1]) = Gj  r1,
∆r(s[r2]) = r1?{li(xi : Si){A′i}.Gi  r2}i∈I .
Case 1: h is empty. By Lemma 7.9, after receiving m, say Σ′ `−→ Σ′′, Σ′′
has s[r1] = Gj  r1 and s[r2] = Gj  r2, Σ′′ is thus consistent by Defini-
tion 7.4. By Definition 7.6, Σ′; 〈r ; m〉 is configurationally consistent, and
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|= M ′ . Σ′ by Lemma 7.10, thus N ′ conforms to Σ′; 〈r ; h·m〉.
Case 2: h is not empty. Since Σ; 〈r ; h〉 is configurationally consistent,
again, by Lemma 7.9, after receiving messages in h (but notm), say Σ′ `0...`n−−−→
Σ′1, where every action in `0 . . . `n corresponds to each message in h, we
have Σ′1; 〈r′ ; m〉 is configurationally consistent. After Σ′1 receives m, say
Σ′1
s[p1,p2]?l〈v〉−−−−−−−→ Σ′′, where s[p1, p2]?l〈v〉 is dual to `, with the same reasoning
above, Σ′′ has s[r1] = G′j  r1 and s[r2] = G′j  r2, so that Σ′′ is consis-
tent. By Definition 7.6, Σ′; 〈r ; h ·m〉 is configurationally consistent, and
|= M ′ . Σ′ by Lemma 7.10, thus N ′ conforms to Σ′; 〈r ; h·m〉.
(Bra) Let ` = s[r1, r2]?lj〈v〉, N `−→g N ′ and N conforms to Σ; 〈route(Σ) ; h〉.
Case 1: h is empty. Since Σ; 〈route(Σ) ; ∅〉 6 `−→g, so this case never happens.
Case 2: h is not empty. Thus, N `−→g N ′ and
Σ; 〈route(Σ) ; h〉 `−→g Σ′; 〈r ; h/m〉,
where h/mmeans taking off messagem from h, wherem = s〈r1, r2, lj〈v〉〉
We have r = route(Σ) = route(Σ′) because there is no change to the el-
ements in Σ or to the routing table. By Definition 7.6, after receiving all
messages in H , Σ is consistent, thus Σ′, which has received message m is
consistent after receiving all messages in h/m. By Lemma 7.10, we have
|= M ′ . Σ′ thus N ′ conforms to Σ′; 〈r ; h/m〉.
(Req) Let ` = a〈s[r] : T 〉. N `−→g N ′ and
Σ; 〈route(Σ) ; h〉 `−→g Σ′; 〈r ; h·m〉,
where m = a〈s[r] : T 〉. Then r = route(Σ) = route(Σ′) because, by Defi-
nition 7.11, nothing new is registered to the routing table.
Since Σ allows ` and Σ is consistent, by Definition 7.4, ∃Γi,Γj ∈ Σ such
that a : I(T [r]) ∈ Γi and a : O(T [r]) ∈ Γj . After Σ `−→ Σ′, by rule [REQ] in
the LTS of specifications, a : I(T [r]) remains in Γ′i, a : O(T [r]) remains in
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Γ′j , and thus they both remain in Σ
′.
Case 1: h is empty. By Lemma 7.9, after receiving m, say Σ′
a〈s[r]:T 〉−−−−−→ Σ′′,
both a : I(T [r]) and a : O(T [r]) remain in Σ′′, satisfying Definition 7.4, so
that Σ′; 〈r ; m〉 is configurationally consistent. By Lemma 7.10, we have
|= M ′ . Σ′, thus N ′ conforms to Σ′; 〈r ; h·m〉.
Case 2: h is not empty. The proof is similar to the one in (Sel) and omitted.
(Acc) Let ` = a〈s[r] : T 〉.
Case 1: h is empty. Since Σ; 〈route(Σ) ; ∅〉 6 `−→g, this case never happens.
Case 2: h is not empty. If N `−→g N ′ and
Σ; 〈route(Σ) ; h〉 `−→g Σ′; 〈r′ ; h/m〉,
where m = a〈s[r] : T 〉. Since there exists ∆ ∈ Σ′ s.t. s[r] ∈ ∆, by Defini-
tion 7.11, r′ = route(Σ), s[r] 7→ α = route(Σ′).
For the same reasoning in (Bra), we have Σ′; 〈r ; h/m〉 is configurationally
consistent. By Lemma 7.10, we have |= M ′ . Σ′ thus N ′ conforms to
Σ′; 〈r ; h/m〉.
The proof for other cases is trivial.
Theorem 7.13 (Session fidelity). If N is fully monitored and conforms to Σ; 〈r ; h〉,
which is configurationally consistent, then N satisifies session fidelity.
Proof. The proof is straightforward by Lemma 7.12 and Definition 7.8.
Proposition 7.14. Whenever a network is fully monitored, global safety implies
session fidelity.




Monitors. Our work features a located, distributed process calculus to model dy-
namic monitored networks. An account of the state of the art of runtime monitors
can be found in [29, 38]. According to Havelund and Goldberg [29], specification-
based runtime verification consists of monitoring a program’s execution against a
user-provided specification of the intended program’s behaviour. Leucker and
Schallhart [38] define runtime verification as the discipline of dealing with the
detection of violations (or satisfaction) of correctness properties. They point out
the use of runtime verification for contract enforcement.
Global specification languages. Message Sequence Charts (MSC), which are
also known as UML sequence diagrams, have been the focus of many works [29,
36, 27, 37]. Among them, Kruger et al. [37] propose a runtime monitoring frame-
work based on projecting MSC to distributed monitors based on finite state ma-
chines. They use aspect-oriented programming techniques to inject the monitors
into the implementation of the components. Gan [26] follows the same path, but
with a centralised approach. Both works do not provide a formal model, formal
guarantees of correctness, nor support behavioural analysis. BPEL [4, 5, 27] is an
orchestration description language that is now a common part of many industrial
distributed systems where web services must be used in a coordinated manner. It
supports the definition of abstract specifications as well as their execution. BPEL
specifications are designed to be run in a centralised way. Baresi et. al [4] devel-
oped a run-time monitoring tool with assertions based on BPEL as an execution
language. When the execution of a BPEL process reaches the point where an
assertion must be checked, the tool calls an external service to check its satis-
faction. This work does not consider properties, such as transparency and local/-
global safety. On another line of research, van der Aalst et al. [50] use abstract
BPEL process as specifications. Their work focuses on checking conformance
between execution logs (obtained by observing a number of executions based on
SOAP message exchanges, and then translated into Petri Nets) and choreogra-
phies expressed as abstract BPEL processes. The focus of [50] is on checking
conformance a posteriori, as well as on revealing (mining) and re-engineering
choreographies according to the actual system’s behaviour. Differently from [50]
our work establishes a theory of dynamic monitoring. The aim of our work is to
observe communication as they occur to prevent unsafe interactions, while provid-
ing a formal framework that complements static (behavioural) typing techniques,
and supports reasoning about equivalence of networks. Finally, WS-CDL is a
more recent description language which aims at describing decentralised chore-
ographies. Cambronero et al. [11] transform choreographies written in WS-CDL
into timed-automata and verify systems against them. The work in [11] does not
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develop a projection algorithm nor ensures global conformance with respect to a
choreography.
Theory of monitored networks. The work of Ferrari et al. [25] proposes an
ambient-based run-time monitoring formalism, called guardians, targeted at ac-
cess control rights for network processes, and Klaim [19] advocates a hybrid
(dynamic and static) approach for access control against capabilities (policies)
to support static checking integrated within a dynamic access-control procedure.
These works address specific forms of access control for mobility, while our more
general approach aims at ensuring correct behaviour in sessions through a combi-
nation of static and run-time verification.
The work of Capecchi et al. [12] presents a monitor-based information-flow
analysis of multiparty sessions. The monitors in [12] are inline (following [14])
and control the information-flow by tagging each message with security levels.
Since each inlined monitor is located within a local process, the interactions be-
tween endpoint processes and their corresponding monitors are synchronous. We
study asynchronous communications that, while being closer to an actual network
implementation, introduce considerable challenges in the development of a theory.
Other works on inlined monitors, such as [28, 1, 49], provide a policy specifica-
tion language. The aim is to write policies into the monitors, with the guarantee
that the specifications in the inlined monitors satisfy the original policies. Inline
monitors require direct access to the code, whereas our approach, outline monitor-
ing (i.e., the implantation of monitors is independent from the implementation of
the observed applications), ensures interoperability with any language and archi-
tecture. Other related works on monitoring conversations are [48, 2]. Simmonds
et al. [48] propose a runtime monitoring approach based on MSC as a specifica-
tion language to represent global protocols, and transform MSC specifications into
automata. They provide conformance checking of finite execution traces against
specifications. Ancona et al. [2, 40] propose a dynamic monitoring framework
based on MPST for Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) to guard interactions between
local agents and their environments. They gave a procedure that automatically
derives a self-monitoring MAS from Jason (a MAS development platform), and
verifies that a MAS implementation is compliant with a given global session type,
which can naturally be represented as cyclic Prolog terms. Their monitoring is
only synchronous. Their development focuses on implementation and does not
involve proofs of formal properties.
Monitoring and MPST. An informal approach to monitoring based on MPST,
and an outline of monitors are presented in [17]. However, [17] only gives an
overview of the desired properties, and requires all local processes to be dynami-
cally verified through the protections of system monitors. In this article, instead,
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we integrate statically and dynamically verified local processes into one network,
and formally state the properties of this combination. Some recent works [3, 18]
use multiparty session types for dynamic updates. Anderson et al. [3] study
channel conditions of running processes to be able to update them and ensure
deadlock-freedom, while a system in Coppo et al. [18] enables to update global
types dynamically. The work [18] is based on the formulation (without assertions)
studied in this article. Recently, Jia and al. [35] proposed a linear-logic based
session-calculus close to ours describing monitor semantics for higher-order ses-
sions which include rules for blame assignment.
In summary, compared to these related works, our contribution focuses on the
enforcement of global safety, with protocols specified as multiparty session types
with assertions. It also provides formalisms and theorems for decentralised run-
time monitoring, targeting interaction between components written in multiple
(e.g., statically and dynamically typed) programming languages.
9. Conclusion and future work
We proposed a new formal safety assurance framework to specify and enforce
global safety of distributed systems through dynamic verification. We formally
proved the correctness of our architectural framework through a pi-calculus based
theory, identified in two key properties of dynamic networks: global transparency
and safety. We introduced a behavioural theory over monitored networks which
allows compositional reasoning over trusted and untrusted (but monitored) com-
ponents.
Implementations. As a part of our collaboration with the Ocean Observatories
Initiative [44], our theoretical framework is currently realised by an implementa-
tion [34, 43, 21], in which each monitor supports all well-formed protocols and
is automatically self-configured, via session initiation messages, for all sessions
that the endpoint participates in. Our implementation of the framework automates
distributed monitoring by generating FSM from the local protocol projections. In
this implementation, the global protocol serves as the key abstraction that helps
unify the aspects of specification, implementation and verification (both static and
dynamic) of distributed application development. Our experience has shown that
the specification framework can accommodate diverse practical use cases, includ-
ing real-world communication patterns used in the distributed services of the OOI
cyberinfrastructure [44].
Future Work. Our objectives include the incorporation in the implementation of
more elaborate handling of error cases into monitor functionality, such as halting
all local sessions or coercing to valid actions [46, 39]. In order to reach this goal,
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we need to combine a simplification of [13] and nested sessions [20] to handle ex-
ceptions inside MPST. We aim to construct a simple and reliable way to raise and
catch exceptions in asynchronous networks. Another direct extension of this work
would be the addition of states (memories) to the syntax, as described in [8, 15].
It would require the monitors to maintain a model of the state of the applications
being monitored, which can be easily formalised in our setting. For the sake of
clarity, we did not add to our local type syntax other syntactical constructs such
as parallel composition but such an extension is possible and could be consid-
ered, as it allows one to reach greater expressiveness [22]. Our work is motivated
by ongoing collaborations with the Savara1 and Scribble2 projects [51, 31] and
OOI [44]. We are continuing the development of Scribble, its toolsuite and asso-
ciated environments towards an integration into [44]. The theoretical framework
developed in this article is extensible as a basis for other applications as demon-
strated in our recent dynamic monitoring implementations for distributed actors
[42] and timers [41]. For instance, the work in [41] extends run-time monitoring
to real-time processes: monitors verify the punctuality of interactions against time
constraints expressed as a timed extension of Scribble based on timed MPST [10].
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